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Abstract 
Neuroscience has become increasingly reliant on multi-subject research in addition 
to studies of unusual single patients. This research has brought with it a challenge: 
how are data from different human brains to be combined? The dominant strategy 
for aggregating data across brains is what I call ‘the cartographic approach’, which 
involves mapping data from individuals to a spatial template. Here I characterize 
the cartographic approach and argue that one of its key steps, registration, should 
be carried out in a way that is sensitive to the target of investigation. Because 
registration aims to align homologous brain locations, but not all homologous 
locations can be simultaneously aligned, a multiplicity of registration methods is 
required to meet the needs of researchers investigating different phenomena. I call 
this position ‘registration pluralism’. Registration pluralism has potential 
implications for neuroscientific practice, three of which I discuss here. This work 
shows the importance of reflecting more carefully on data aggregation methods, 
especially in light of the substantial individual differences that exist between brains.   
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1   Introduction: Data Aggregation in Neuroscience 
Neuropsychology has a long history of drawing conclusions from lone, anomalous cases (think of 
Phineas Gage or H.M.), but most neuroscientists agree that collecting data from multiple subjects 
is preferable when it is feasible. The brain is a notoriously noisy organ, and using multiple subjects 
helps to distinguish the signal from the noise. It also ensures that one’s findings are not hostage to 
the idiosyncrasies of a single brain. But the use of multiple subjects brings with it the challenge of 
data aggregation: how are the data from different people to be combined and analysed? 
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  One dominant strategy for dealing with data aggregation in neuroscience is what I will call 
‘the cartographic approach’. On the cartographic approach, cross-brain comparison and 
aggregation are accomplished by placing whole-brain data from multiple subjects into a common 
reference frame or onto a template (Toga et al. [2006]). This mapping (or ‘registering’) of 
individual data into a shared space allows brains to be compared and group-level statistics to be 
computed. Although alternative aggregation strategies exist,1 the cartographic approach has been 
widely adopted since at least the mid-twentieth century. In that time, it has evolved substantially: 
from the visual inspection of paper atlases, constructed from post mortem examination of stained 
sections; through the invention of stereotactic spaces and early landmark-based alignment 
methods, which were designed for neurosurgery but coopted for neuroimaging research in the 
1980s; to the construction of digital brain atlases and the proliferation of automated and semi-
automated registration methods, which continues to the present (Toga and Mazziotta [2002]; Toga 
et al. [2006]; Evans et al. [2012]).  
  In this paper, I will characterize the present-day cartographic approach and argue against a 
tempting view about registration, one of its key components. The view I reject, which I call 
‘registration monism’, maintains that all brain data should be registered to spatial templates in the 
same way. The registration monist takes it to be a problem that different researchers currently use 
different registration methods and believes that eventually neuroscientists should or will converge 
on the single best one. I’ll argue that this view of the cartographic approach is mistaken. Instead, 
we ought to embrace ‘registration pluralism’, which claims that the best way to register data to a 
brain template depends on the phenomenon under investigation. Registration pluralism asserts the 
in-principle impossibility of ever finding a single spatial mapping suitable for all neuroscientific 
purposes. This impossibility is a consequence of the substantial individual differences that exist in 
the organization of the human brain. 
  I begin in Section 2 by describing the fundamental components of the cartographic 
approach. Section 3 introduces registration pluralism and Sections 4 and 5 defend it. I then flesh 
out its scope in Section 6. Finally, I explore its possible methodological consequences in Section 
7 and its broader philosophical significance in Section 8. 
 
2   The Contemporary Cartographic Approach to Aggregation Across Brains 
True to its name, the cartographic approach to aggregation involves mapping information about 
the brains of individuals to a shared spatial reference frame: whole-brain data from different 
subjects are projected onto a two- or three-dimensional template or into a stereotactic space (Fig. 
1).2 Statistical analysis is then conducted on the aggregate data. Often this involves the use of an 
                                                
1 Alternative strategies include the functional localizer approach (Poline et al. [2010]), temporal alignment 
(Zhang et al. [2017]), and hyperalignment (Haxby et al. [2011]).  
2 The cartographic approach, and the problem of aggregation which it solves, can be found in many medical 
imaging contexts, not just in neuroscience (Crum et al. [2003]). The issues to be discussed here may therefore 
have analogues in other parts of physiology and biomedical science. How far the analogies extend, including 
whether registration pluralism applies to organs besides the brain, is an empirical matter (see Sections 5 and 6).  
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atlas to divide the template brain into distinct regions. To understand the cartographic approach in 
its contemporary form, it is important to understand these central components.  
A stereotactic space is a coordinate system used for specifying locations in the brain 
relative to internal or external landmarks (Roland and Zilles [1994]; Rahman et al. [2009]). 
Stereotactic spaces may be two- or three-dimensional (Tucholka et al. [2012]), and they may be 
applicable to the entire brain or just a part of it. Each stereotactic space comes with rules about 
how a brain is to be positioned in the space: it specifies where the origin lies and how the axes are 
oriented. Once a brain is mapped to a stereotactic space, specific points can be labeled with 
stereotactic coordinates. A groundbreaking stereotactic coordinate system in neuroscience was 
introduced by Talairach et al. ([1967]). The three-dimensional ‘Talairach space’ uses the inter-
hemispheric fissure and the anterior and posterior commissures, subcortical structures that are 
relatively invariant across individuals, for orientation.  
A brain template is a representation of a brain onto which other brains are mapped. 
Templates may also be called targets, references, or baseline images (Crum et al. [2004]). Some 
studies use a brain scan from one subject chosen at random to be the image to which all others are 
normalized. Others use templates that have been constructed by averaging images from multiple 
subjects. Many stereotactic spaces are associated with templates. Talairach and Tournoux ([1988]), 
for example, published a template to go along with the Talairach space some twenty years after it 
was introduced. Like stereotactic spaces, a template can be two- or three-dimensional (Saad and 
Reynolds [2012]). 
An atlas is distinct from a template in that it has labeled parts. Atlases are representations 
of the brain that partition the volume (if it is three-dimensional) or surface (if it is two-dimensional) 
into discrete, labeled regions (Gholipour et al. [2007]). The regions that atlases pick out may be 
cytoarchitectural, macroanatomical, functional, histological, or chemoarchitectural. There are a 
variety of brain atlases in use today: MNI, ICBM, Harvard-Oxford, and Freesurfer, to name a few 
(Evans et al. [2012]). Even though some authors use ‘template’ and ‘atlas’ interchangeably (Toga 
[1998]; Dickie et al. [2017]), it is important to distinguish them because the construction of atlases 
raises a host of issues about how to divide the brain into parts that templates alone do not. Selecting 
a representative template is a different problem from partitioning a template in a scientifically 
useful way.   
Registration is the process of transforming a target image in order to relate positions in the 
target to positions in a template or stereotactic space. This paper will deal only with cross-subject 
registration, not the co-registration of multiple images from the same subject, so I will use the term 
‘registration’ interchangeably with ‘normalization’. To register or normalize an image is to 
determine a ‘mapping’, a ‘warping’, or a ‘spatial transformation’ from the image to the template.3 
A registration method typically consists of three components: a similarity measure, an optimization 
measure, and a mapping (Crum et al. [2004]). The similarity measure provides a way of assessing 
how well the image matches the template. (For example, a very crude similarity measure for two 
                                                
3 In what follows I will primarily discuss registration to templates, but my conclusions apply equally well to 
registration to reference spaces.  
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images of the same size would be the sum of the difference in intensity values of every 
corresponding pair of pixels.) An optimization procedure is used to choose a transformation that 
maximizes the similarity measure. The transformation that is selected is then applied to the image 
to register the image to the template. 
 It is common to distinguish between two broad kinds of registration methods: intensity-
based and feature-based approaches.4 Intensity-based approaches employ a similarity measure that 
assesses the difference in image intensity between the target and the template. Feature-based 
approaches, by contrast, represent distinct ‘elements in each of the scans to be matched […] 
includ[ing] functionally important surfaces, curves, and point landmarks. [These] elements are 
each parameterized and matched with their counterparts in the target scan, and their 
correspondences guide the volumetric transformation’ (Toga [1998], p. 4). In other words, 
intensity-based approaches select transformations that make the image look visually similar to the 
template, while feature-based approaches aim to bring specific landmarks into alignment. 
Intensity-based approaches have gradually been losing ground to feature-based approaches over 
the last several decades, partly because the range of usable features has expanded (Ashburner 
[2012]). Early feature-based registration was based on gross macroanatomical landmarks; now, 
there are feature-based methods that incorporate information about curves, major sulci/gyri, 
microstructure, and even function (see Section 7.2). 
 I will only be discussing registration methods that map data onto a two- or three-
dimensional template with a standard spatial interpretation. (I’ll sometimes call this ‘spatial 
registration’.) There are other kinds of registration, used by non-cartographic approaches, to which 
my arguments do not apply. For instance, one can align some kinds of neuroscientific and 
psychological data temporally (Zhang [2017]). Another non-cartographic data aggregation method 
is hyperalignment, which involves projecting individual data into an abstract, high-dimensional 
space (Haxby et al. [2011]). Both alternative kinds of registration fall outside the scope of my 
discussion. 
 Philosophers of neuroscience have done a good deal of work on topics related to brain 
atlases, such as the problem of identifying the brain’s parts or functions (van Orden [1997]; Klein 
[2012]; Anderson [2014]). They have paid relatively little attention to apparently prior questions 
about how neuroscientific data is aggregated in the first place.5 Despite its neglect by philosophers, 
registration has been the object of intense scientific activity. Over the last several decades, 
scientists have developed an increasingly diverse and sophisticated set of registration methods. 
The simplest transformations that one can apply to a brain image include translation (moving the 
image up/down or left/right), scaling (changing the image’s overall size), and rotation (rotating the 
image around the origin). Early registration techniques used these kinds of simple transformations. 
                                                
4 This distinction goes by many names, including ‘geometric vs. intensity approaches’ (Crum et al. [2004]), 
‘model-based vs. intensity-based approaches’ (Toga [1998]), ‘label-based vs. non-label-based approaches’ 
(Friston et al. [1995]), and ‘photometric vs. geometric approaches’ (Hellier et al. [2003]).  
5 As we will see below, the task of alignment only appears to be prior to the identification of parts in the brain. 
Registration pluralism implies that selecting an appropriate registration method requires one to pick out certain 
brain locations as salient, which would seem to require some type of neuroscientific ontology.  
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The original Talairach method, for example, divides an individual brain image into 12 rectangular 
regions, each of which is individually scaled and positioned using piecewise affine transformations 
(Toga [1998]; Chau and McIntosh [2005]). By contemporary standards, this is a very crude 
procedure. Simple rigid transformations have now been largely replaced by affine and non-linear 
transformations, which have significantly more degrees of freedom (Crum et al. [2004]; Toga and 
Thompson [2007]). Unlike the Talairach method, which can only reposition and rescale the brain 
in limited ways, newer registration techniques allow neuroscientists to move, dilate, stretch, scale, 
and rotate brain images in a highly complex fashion. 
   
3   Registration Pluralism 
There is now a wide array of spatial registration methods available to the neuroscientist who adopts 
the cartographic approach. Some researchers have expressed concern about this variety of methods 
(van Essen and Dierker [2007]) or implicitly assumed that it is temporary, to be winnowed down 
over time as we move toward the single best registration method. Such an attitude is arguably 
implicit, for example, in the literature on the validation and comparison of different registration 
methods. Many papers that compare multiple methods conclude with an overall recommendation 
about which method provides ‘the optimal alignment’ or is ‘the best registration method’, without 
obviously indexing these phrases to a specific neuroscientific context (Klein et al. [2009]; 
Robinson et al. [2014]). Improvements to the optimization methods used to select transformations, 
the increasing mathematical complexity of mappings, and the inclusion of more features in cost 
functions may be taken to suggest that we are getting ever closer to the ideal, universally applicable 
registration procedure. Let’s call the view that there is a single best registration method toward 
which all current methods strive ‘registration monism’.6 
  In what follows, I aim to show that registration monism is mistaken. There can be no 
universally applicable registration procedure because, given the nature of the brain, different target 
phenomena require different methods. I intend to defend registration pluralism: 
Registration pluralism: There is more than one appropriate way to register a brain to a 
spatial template. The best registration method depends on the phenomenon under 
investigation. 
Registration pluralism is an analog of pluralism about atlases, a far more visible and popular view. 
Neuroscientists frequently acknowledge that there is no single best way of partitioning the cortex, 
and that different atlases may be appropriate for different purposes (Arslan et al. [2018]; Dickie et 
al. [2017]). Bohland et al. ([2009]), for example, argue that, ‘it is highly unlikely that the 
neuroscience community will, or even should, adopt a single scheme for partitioning the brain or 
for labeling its pieces’ because ‘the motivations underlying the construction of one atlas can be 
different from another’ (p. 11). Many express this ecumenical attitude about atlases (Toga and 
                                                
6 I will try to show in Section 7 that a monistic attitude toward registration is at least implicit in several 
neuroscientific practices. I hope that this will satisfy the skeptical reader that, even if there are not many 
scientists who explicitly endorse registration monism, it is still a worthwhile target for criticism.  
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Thompson [2001]; Brett et al. [2002]; Shattuck et al. [2008]; Amunts et al. [2014]). Registration 
pluralism is in the same spirit. Different registration methods, as well as different partitioning 
schemes, ought to be applied in different scientific contexts. 
The plausibility of registration pluralism can be illustrated with a simple example. Consider 
two hypothetical research projects. The first concerns the relationship between sleep/wake cycles 
and functional activation in areas of the brain that specialize in language processing. The research 
question is: how does the BOLD signal in language processing regions change over the course of 
the day? The second research project examines the effects of mercury on the brain (Azevedo et al. 
[2012]). This researcher asks: do people who have had more mercury exposure have more GABA-
A receptor activity in cortex surrounding the calcarine sulcus? Let’s imagine that both researchers 
are committed to using the cartographic approach to aggregate their multi-subject data. My 
contention is that the two researchers should register their data in different ways. For the first 
project, the researcher should try to align brain regions thought to be involved in the same 
language-related functions. For the second, the researcher should try to align the calcarine sulcus 
and its surrounding brain tissue. Given that brains are slightly different from one another, a 
transformation that aligns language processing regions will not perfectly align points surrounding 
the calcarine sulcus. Hence, different registration methods are required in the two cases. Diversity 
in our neuroscientific projects necessitates registration pluralism. 
The following two sections will generalize the reasoning in this simple example to provide 
an argument for registration pluralism. Section 4 will characterize the goal of registration and 
Section 5 will show that the goal cannot be achieved with a single method.  
 
4   Homology and the Goal of Registration 
The first step of the argument for registration pluralism requires understanding what registration 
aims to do. Fortunately, neuroscientists who employ the cartographic approach are quite explicit 
on this point. Nearly every author who writes about registration claims that the goal of registration 
is ‘to maximize the genuine homology of points that are brought into correspondence by the 
transformations’ (Mazziotta et al. [2001], p. 1301). Or, to put it a different way, ‘the objective is 
to warp the images such that homologous regions of different brains are moved as close together 
as possible’ (Ashburner et al. [1997], pp. 350–1). Registration to a template succeeds to the extent 
that ‘homologous cortical regions in different subjects have been brought into register by the 
registration transform’ (Toga and Thompson [2001], p. 4). I see no reason to doubt this consensus, 
so I take it that the aim of registration is to align homologous locations across brains. 
The real challenge is understanding what this means. It may be tempting to think that the 
homology concept at work here is simply a homology concept from biology applied to cognitive 
science. I believe this is mistaken: neuroscientists discussing the cartographic approach do not use 
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‘homology’ in the same way as biologists or philosophers of biology (Brigandt [2002]; Wagner 
[1994], [2014]).7  
The concept of homology originated with Richard Owen ([1843]), who famously defined 
a homologue as ‘the same organ in different animals under every variety of form and function’. 
Owen was a comparative anatomist, interested in how animals from different species seem to 
instantiate the same ‘archetypes’ (Panchen [1994]). Although the concept of homology has 
changed since Owen, biologists continue to understand homology primarily as a cross-species 
notion. This is the first reason that a biological interpretation of ‘homology’ in the context of brain 
registration is inappropriate. Registration is used to align the brains of individuals from the same 
species. When neuroscientists talk about points in the brain being homologous across people, they 
are not using ‘homology’ to talk about inter-specific relationships, as a biologist would. Even the 
concept of serial homology in biology bears no resemblance to the neuroscientist’s concept, since 
it involves the repetition of a part within one and the same animal. Hence, there is no inter-
individual but intra-specific sense of ‘homologous’ that neuroscientists could be importing directly 
from biology.  
 One might think it would be perfectly natural to apply biologists’ homology concept(s) to 
within-species relationships even if biologists do not. After all, it seems possible to talk about 
homologies across different dog breeds, even though all dogs belong to the same species. Even 
granting this, there are other indications that neuroscientists are using ‘homology’ differently from 
biologists. In contemporary biology and philosophy of biology, a distinction is frequently made 
between two homology concepts: genealogical homology and developmental homology (Wagner 
[1989]; Brigandt [2002]; Ramsey and Peterson [2012]). Homologous parts in the genealogical 
sense share a phylogenetic origin, while homologous parts in the developmental sense are subject 
to the same developmental constraints and underwritten by common ontogenic mechanisms 
(Wagner [1994]). Neither a genealogical nor a developmental homology concept is reflected in the 
neuroscientific usage. Very few of the neuroscientists who adopt the cartographic approach are 
investigating the evolution of the nervous system, so it would be strange to interpret their use of 
the phrase ‘homologous parts’ in terms of phylogeny. When neuroscientists use the cartographic 
approach, they do not discuss the evolutionary history of the places in the brain they are attempting 
to align, nor do they try to establish that the places share a common phylogenetic origin. The 
genealogical homology concept is therefore ill suited to the context of registration. A 
developmental homology concept can be ruled out for similar reasons. Neuroscientists do not need 
to know anything about the development of the brain locations they intend to co-register. Their 
aim during registration is to align present structure or function across individuals. They make no 
effort to show that the co-registered locations share a developmental trajectory or are subject to 
the same constraints, as would be expected if they were deploying a developmental homology 
concept. 
                                                
7 This is not to say that neuroscientists never use ‘homology’ this way (Liebeskind et al. [2016]). It also may 
be the case that neuroscientists’ usage of ‘homologous’ is historically related to biologists’ usage.  
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 For these reasons, the phrase ‘homologous locations in the brain’ should not be understood 
by appeal to biologists’ homology concept(s). Instead, neuroscientists should be read simply as 
using homology as a synonym for sameness. Neuroscientists call places in different brains 
‘homologous’ when they are the same. Importantly, however, sameness of brain locations across 
people cannot be specified tout court because there are many different kinds of sameness that one 
might be interested in (Goodman [1972]). In the hypothetical case above, one researcher cares 
about points that have the same language-processing functions while the other cares about points 
in the same position relative to the calcarine sulcus. Sameness of functional capacity is distinct 
from sameness of sulcus-centered positioning. Because sameness is always sameness-in-some-
respect, which type of sameness is relevant in any particular scientific context is determined by 
the target of investigation. Sameness of location in the brain, and therefore homology of brain 
locations, is purpose-relative.8 
 This should not surprise us since it is just an instance of a general phenomenon. Sameness 
of location within wholes is purpose-relative whenever the wholes are qualitatively different from 
one another. Consider a simple inanimate example: imagine there are two similar houses, and a 
location in one house has been singled out as a point of interest. We might ask the question: where 
is the same location in the other house? The answer clearly depends on what we are interested in. 
There are many places in the second house that one could identify as the ‘same’ as the place in the 
first: the location that is the same absolute distance from the front door; the location that is the 
same distance, proportionally, from the two ends of the house; the location that contains the same 
piece of furniture; and so on. Sameness of location in houses is purpose-relative. Brains are no 
different from houses in this respect.  
In line with this, several neuroscientists acknowledge that different types of homologies in 
the brain exist simultaneously. Mazziotta et al. ([2001]) explain that ‘various criteria can be used 
to define homology’ (p. 1301). They distinguish between ‘anatomical [and] functional 
homologues’ and then proceed to make finer grained distinctions within these categories, arguing 
that ‘homologies based on function and cytoarchitectonics are more fundamental to neuroscience 
[…] than homologies based on sulcal and gyral anatomy’ (Mazziotta et al. [2001], p. 1316, p. 
1301). Likewise, Uylings et al. ([2005]) claim that a ‘critical issue’ for any study is ‘defining the 
criterion of correspondence, i.e. homology’ (p. 424). This implies that different criteria are 
available. At least some neuroscientists agree, then, that homology in the brain is purpose-relative. 
In what follows, I use the term ‘homologous’ to mean sameness-in-some-respect, in keeping with 
this standard scientific usage. 
 
                                                
8 Some biologists have claimed that homology is actually ‘context dependent’ in just this way (Abouheif 
[1997]). Wagner ([1994]) argues that ‘homology is a scientific conceptualization of th[e] perception of 
‘sameness’’ (p. 274). He thinks the reason homology has been such a tricky concept is that there are different 
‘aspects’ of sameness that are prioritized by different biologists: ‘the same structural organization, the same 
developmental origin, the same developmental constraints, the same (genetic) information, and common 
phylogenetic origin’ (Wagner [1994], p. 274). If Wagner is right, the analogy between biological and 
neuroscientific uses of ‘homology’ need not be rejected after all: both are purpose-relative. 
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5   Organizational Variation and Failures of Simultaneous Alignment 
We have now seen that the goal of registration is to align locations across brains that are the same. 
Furthermore, there are different ways for brain locations to count as ‘the same’. By itself, this does 
not establish registration pluralism. To understand why, let’s return to the house analogy. Imagine 
that that an architect is trying to register two houses’ blueprints to a single template. If the houses 
were built by the same developer in a cookie-cutter suburban neighborhood, they may be 
essentially identical. In this situation, it may be possible to register the blueprints to the template 
in a way that preserves all the homologous relationships the architect cares about. A single 
transformation will be sufficient to align points that are the same distance from the front door, 
locations with the same furniture, walls with the same load-bearing capacity, rooms with the same 
practical functions, and so on. Registration, for the architect, need not be sensitive to the feature 
of interest. 
Human brains are too different from one another for this to work in neuroscience. Spatial 
alignment of one kind of homologous brain location will not align homologous locations of all 
other types. A registration method that brings the sulci and gyri of two different brains into 
alignment, for instance, will not perfectly align cytoarchitectural regions, and vice versa. This is 
because the brain’s organization is variable across people: different types of regions do not stand 
in constant spatial relationships to one another. For example, the position of one person’s 
occipitotemporal sulcus relative to his Wernicke’s area may not be the same as the relative position 
of another person’s occipitotemporal sulcus and Wernicke’s area. Consequently, by aligning two 
subjects’ occipitotemporal sulci, you may not succeed in aligning their Wernicke’s areas, and vice 
versa. Organizational variation prevents there being a single way of spatially aligning all 
homologous brain regions at once.9  
Evidence for this claim comes from studies showing individual differences in the relative 
positioning of different types of brain regions. First, it is well known that macroanatomical features 
like sulci and gyri are variably positioned relative to cytoarchitectural boundaries (Uylings et al. 
[2005]; Amunts et al. [2007]). Amunts et al. ([1999]) demonstrate this variation in their classic 
examination of Brodmann’s areas 44 and 45. They use a computerized technique to identify 
cytoarchitectural borders on stained brain sections and then compare the cytoarchitectural regions 
identified with macroanatomical landmarks. The authors find significant inter-individual 
differences in the location of cytoarchitectural regions relative to macroanatomical features: ‘one 
and the same cytoarchitectural border was located in a sulcal fundus in some [individuals’] 
hemispheres but on one or the other wall of the sulcus or at the top of the gyrus in others’ (Amunts 
et al. [1999], p. 335). Scheperjans et al. ([2008]) reach the same conclusion about superior parietal 
                                                
9 As some authors have noted (Klein et al. [2009]), a neuroscientist using the cartographic approach has to 
assume that the locations he is attempting to align are present in all brains. This assumption might not always 
be justified. For example, Nieto-Castañón and Fedorenko ([2012]) argue that it is unlikely that exact 
correspondences exist between ocular dominance columns in V1 of different individuals. They claim that it 
would be a mistake to try to co-register such fine-grained functional regions. When is it safe to assume that the 
same location exists across brains, and that it is therefore appropriate to apply the cartographic approach? This 
is an important question that deserves more attention.   
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cortex. Using a similar technique, they find that ‘the locations of [cytoarchitectonic] borders are 
not reliably associated with macroanatomical landmarks’ (Scheperjans et al. [2008], p. 2152).  
There is also considerable evidence that macroanatomy and function are not predictably 
related to one another. For instance, Watson et al. ([1993]) examine intersubject variability in the 
location of V5, a visual motor area, in relation to sulcal and gyral patterns. They define V5 
functionally by comparing PET data collected while subjects saw a moving or stationary 
checkerboard. They find that the position of V5 can ‘vary by as much as 27 mm in the left 
hemisphere and 18 mm in the right’ relative to macroanatomical features (Watson et al. [1993], p. 
79). Others have stressed that although some functional areas, like the frontal eye fields, are 
strongly related to macroanatomy, others, like the fusiform face area, are not (Frost and Goebel 
[2012]). The divergences are emphasized by critics of the cartographic approach, who argue that 
registration methods based on anatomical features often fail to align functional regions of interest 
(Fedorenko and Kanwisher [2009], Nieto-Castañón and Fedorenko [2012]).  
What of the relationship between cytoarchitectural and functional regions? It is usually 
thought that functional differences between brain regions are underwritten by cytoarchitectural 
differences, and hence that there is a close correspondence between cytoarchitectural and 
functional areas. If this is correct, cytoarchitectural regions do generally stand in constant spatial 
relationships with functional regions; indeed, they are coextensive. However, not all functional 
divisions are marked by changes in cytoarchitecture. Weiner et al. ([2017]) examine the 
relationship between cytoarchitectural regions and functional regions in human ventral temporal 
cortex (VTC). As predicted, they observe that face- and place-selective regions in VTC have 
different cytoarchitectural properties. They also find, however, that there is a ‘many-to-one 
mapping’ between functional regions of interest (fROIs) and cytoarchitectural regions (cROIs), 
with several fROIs contained within a single cROI (Weiner et al. [2017], p. 155). 
Hence, there is considerable empirical evidence that macroanatomical, cytoarchitectural, 
and functional brain regions do not stand in constant spatial relationships with one another. This 
indicates that organizational variation in the brain prevents the simultaneous spatial alignment of 
every type of homologous region. Given that registration aims to align homologous regions, 
different registration methods should be used in different scientific contexts. Registration 
pluralism follows. Note that this argument is not based on the shortcomings of our current methods. 
That there is no way to spatially align all homologous brain regions at once is a consequence of 
the nature of the brain, not the limits of our current tools for studying it. As such, registration 
pluralism captures a permanent feature of the cartographic approach rather than a temporary 
obstacle.  
The importance of purpose-relative registration is supported by work aimed at comparing 
different registration methods. Crivello et al. ([2002]), for example, register the same fMRI and 
PET data to a Human Brain Atlas template using four different registration methods and then 
assess the methods’ success using several different metrics. They calculate the degree of spatial 
overlap between the template and the normalized individual MRI volumes for grey matter, white 
matter, and cerebrospinal fluid (CSF). Two of the normalization procedures Crivello et al. use are 
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the procedure implemented in the 1996 Statistical Parametric Mapping software (SPM), a popular 
software package for neuroimagers, and a multi-grid technique based on Navier-Lamé continuum 
mechanics theory (FMG). The details of the SPM and FMG methods do not concern us. What 
matters is that they excelled in different respects: the FMG method was the best of the four methods 
at aligning anatomical landmarks, while the SPM method was best at CSF alignment (Crivello et 
al. [2002], p. 237). None of the methods dominated the others.  
Although the authors do not discuss the implications of this result (indeed, it is not even 
highlighted as an important finding), it lends support to registration pluralism. It suggests that if a 
researcher is interested in using the cartographic approach to answer a question about CSF, she 
ought to use SPM; if the alignment of macroanatomy is more important given her project, she 
ought to use FMG. Surprisingly, despite the obvious way in which their findings support purpose-
relative registration, Crivello et al. do not endorse registration pluralism. At the end of their paper, 
they argue that FMG is the ‘normalization procedure providing the highest degree of accuracy’ 
and recommend that researchers adopt it (Crivello et al. [2002], p. 248). They seem to think that 
different registration techniques are simply better or worse at providing ‘the most accurate brain’, 
ignoring the fact that accuracy is purpose-relative (Crivello et al. [2002], p. 248). 
Papers like this one also show that the errors introduced by failing to register one’s data in 
a context-appropriate way can be large enough to scuttle a statistical analysis. One might have 
thought that neuroimaging is so noisy that minor failures of alignment produced by use of a 
general-purpose registration method would not make a difference to one’s ability to obtain 
statistically significant results. But the literature on the validation of registration methods suggests 
otherwise. It is not uncommon for researchers to compare different methods using statistical tests 
on data that have been registered in different ways. For instance, Nenning et al. ([2017]) perform 
a group-level activation analysis of task-based fMRI data that have been registered with two 
different methods. They find that one method results in central regions with higher t-values, 
meaning that it allows more sensitive region detection than the other. Such results show that the 
use of context-appropriate registration methods can increase statistical power and thus appreciably 
improve experimental outcomes, despite the noisiness of neuroimaging.  
  There are some neuroscientists who, unlike Crivello et al. ([2002]), embrace registration 
pluralism by acknowledging that different projects demand different mappings (Friston et al. 
[1995]; Evans et al. [2012]). Hellier et al. ([2003]) claim that ‘the ‘ideal’ transformation surely 
depends on the application’ (p. 1120). Crum et al. ([2003]) agree that ‘the kind of correspondence, 
the manner of achieving it, and the acceptable accuracy are application dependent […] the 
scientific question defines the kinds of correspondence that should be sought’ (p. 1434). And 
Dubois and Adolphs ([2016]) recommend ‘that investigators try more than one approach to 
alignment, and report all of them, so we can see which might work best for which kinds of 
questions’ (p. 427). As we will see in Section 7, however, even researchers who endorse 
registration pluralism in the abstract may not have fully considered its potential methodological 
implications.  
 
 12 
6   The Scope of Registration Pluralism 
I have argued that the goal of registration in the cartographic approach is to align homologous 
locations across brains, but that individual differences make it impossible to achieve this goal with 
a single registration method. When I offered empirical evidence of individual differences, I 
focused on macroanatomical, cytoarchitectural, and functional regions because they provide 
paradigmatic examples of the kinds of homologous locations to be aligned in different research 
contexts. Registration pluralism would be of limited interest, however, if it held only across these 
broad categories. A critic might grant that researchers interested in macroanatomy need to use 
different registration methods than those interested in function, but insist that all macroanatomists 
should use the same method. The same could be said of all functional researchers and all 
cytoarchitectural researchers. None of the evidence discussed above entails that registration has to 
be purpose-sensitive even within broad research areas.  
This objection hints at a broader question about the scope of my view. I have so far spoken 
of registration pluralism as an all-or-nothing thesis asserting that, given the nature of the human 
brain, there cannot be single registration method appropriate for all neuroscientific projects. So 
conceived, registration pluralism is true. However, such a thesis is of limited utility by itself. What 
we really want to know is which projects require different registration methods and which do not. 
After all, the claim that no method will suffice for all purposes doesn’t imply that there are no two 
purposes for which a single method will suffice. So, just how pluralist should we be about 
registration? A pithy answer is: as pluralist as the evidence requires. The more variation there is in 
the positioning of different types of brain locations relative to one another, the greater the variety 
of registration methods that are needed. 
There is in fact empirical evidence of organizational variability even within the three major 
brain modalities, implying that the scope of registration pluralism is wider than the critic above 
suggests. Much of the research cited in Section 5 in support of the idea that cytoarchitectural and 
macroanatomical regions do not stand in constant spatial relationships also shows that different 
cytoarchitectural regions are variably positioned relative to one another. In their microstructural 
study, Scheperjans et al. ([2008]) find that which cytoarchitectural regions border one another is 
different across brains. For example, area hIP3 only borders hIP1 in half of the hemispheres they 
examine. They conclude that ‘a considerable number of cytoarchitectonic borders are not present 
in every brain’ (Scheperjans et al. [2008], p. 2152). It is also well-known that the three-dimensional 
size and shape of cytoarchitectural regions differ between people. This suggests that a scientist 
needing to align, say, Brodmann’s area (BA) 17 across subjects may require a different registration 
method than a scientist needing to align BA44. Moreover, there are sub-regions within 
cytoarchitectural areas whose relative positioning varies. Amunts et al. ([1999]) describe 
substantial variability within BA44 and BA45, including lamina whose distribution patterns differ 
substantially between people. This evidence suggests that different registration methods are 
needed for research concerning different cytoarchitectural features.  
A similar conclusion is arguably true of functional research as well: different kinds of 
locations count as functionally homologous, and the relative positioning of different functional 
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homologues is such that they cannot all be simultaneously aligned. The reasons for this are 
somewhat more theoretical. First, given the assumedly tight relationship between cytoarchitecture 
and function, if different types of cytoarchitectural regions cannot be simultaneously aligned, as 
suggested above, the same is likely true of different functional regions. Second, recent theorizing 
about neural reuse supports the idea that the functional organization of the brain precludes the use 
of a single registration method for all functional purposes. The neural reuse hypothesis states that 
‘individual neural elements (at multiple spatial scales) are used and reused for multiple cognitive 
and behavioral ends’ (Anderson [2016], p. 1). Anderson ([2014], [2016]) argues that each brain 
region has a functional ‘fingerprint’ or ‘profile’ but can be recruited for a diverse array of tasks. 
The brain is constantly re-organizing and functional partnerships between brain regions are not 
fixed. Which regions are recruited for a particular task depends on current activation patterns and 
other functional demands. Anderson’s dynamic, fragmented view of the brain’s functional 
organization supports the idea that locations that are functionally ‘the same’ may be highly 
variable, both across time and across people. Such neural flexibility and complexity make it 
impossible to align all functionally homologous points at once.  
All of this suggests a wide scope for registration pluralism. The critic imagined above 
conceded that different neuroscientific contexts require different registration methods, but claimed 
that contexts should be individuated quite coarsely: we need only differentiate between a 
‘cytoarchitectural context’, a ‘macroanatomical context’, and a ‘functional context’, because 
within each of these, a single registration method suffices. The evidential and theoretical 
considerations raised here, however, suggest that contexts need to be considerably more fine-
grained. I have not specified the level of grain precisely, partly because to do so would be 
premature. We understand relatively little about individual differences in the spatial positioning of 
the brain’s different features. Our ideas about which projects require different registration methods 
and which don’t must therefore be continually refined in light of new empirical findings.10  
 
7   Potential Methodological Implications of Registration Pluralism 
Defending registration pluralism in principle is easier than figuring out what it means for 
neuroscientists in practice. The challenge is not just to delimit its scope, but also to determine the 
broader impacts of the methodology it seems to recommend. The use of different registration 
procedures in different scientific contexts might well increase alignment accuracy, but it could also 
have adverse effects on other scientific desiderata. Deciding whether such trade-offs are worth 
making requires data- and simulation-driven assessments of various methodological approaches 
along multiple dimensions. In this section, I’ll gesture at three potential methodological 
consequences of registration pluralism that are deserving of further study. 
 
                                                
10 This section has focused on questions about the scope of registration pluralism with respect to the 
granularity of neuroscientific contexts. But scope questions are also spatial: it is possible that registration 
pluralism holds with respect to some brain regions but not others (namely, those that are more variable across 
individuals).  
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7.1 Purpose-sensitive selection of registration methods 
First, registration pluralism seems to imply that researchers who adopt the cartographic approach 
should select a registration method in a purpose-sensitive manner. In practice, this is rare in studies 
with neurotypical individuals.11 Neuroscientists usually do not justify their choice of registration 
method in print, and when they do, it is in general terms that do not engage with the specific 
features of their research question. They may, for example, explain that the registration method 
was chosen because it came as a default in a software package or because it was not 
computationally demanding. Registration pluralism suggests that neuroscientists who adopt the 
cartographic approach should explicitly identify the locations they are hoping to align and then 
select a registration method likely to align those homologous locations (Crum et al. [2003]). There 
are several worries one might have about this recommendation: one could object that choosing a 
registration method in a purpose-sensitive manner is not practically feasible; that it presents an 
obstacle to comparability across studies; or that it could be a source of bias. While all three are 
serious concerns, I believe they do not decisively undermine purpose-sensitive registration. 
The first objection is that it is too much to ask of researchers that they tailor registration to 
their research question. Neuroscientists, on this view, have too little information about the 
performance of different methods to make a purpose-sensitive choice. Luckily, this is not the 
situation that neuroscientists find themselves in. Researchers can choose a registration method by 
consulting the rapidly expanding literature on the validation of registration methods, which I 
discussed briefly in Sections 3 and 5 (Woods et al. [1998]; Crivello et al. [2002]; Hellier et al. 
[2003]; Crum et al. [2004]; Ng et al. [2009]; Klein et al. [2009]; Conroy et al. [2013]; Robinson 
et al. [2014]). As many authors have noted, it is usually impossible to directly assess how well a 
registration method aligns homologous regions because there is no ‘gold standard’ against which 
to compare (Woods et al. [1998]; Brett et al. [2002]; Gholipour et al. [2007]). It is, however, 
possible to use indirect measures of evaluation. Many of these metrics measure some dimension 
of accurate alignment (Gholipour et al. [2007]). Klein et al. ([2009]), in one of the most 
comprehensive validation efforts, compare fourteen registration methods along eight different 
dimensions. Since they are interested in anatomical alignment, they use manually labeled structural 
images as a ‘silver standard’ for comparison. For each of the fourteen methods, they compare the 
registered images of individual subjects with the manually labeled images. They measure volume 
overlap agreement (three different measures), volume overlap error (two measures), surface 
overlap agreement (one measure), volume similarity (one measure), and distance error (one 
measure) between the source and target images. The data show that the fourteen registration 
methods perform differently on these eight metrics.  
We ought to think of such papers as providing information for choosing registration 
methods in a purpose-sensitive way rather than identifying the all-around best method. The variety 
of evaluation metrics on offer permit an individual neuroscientist to select the method that does 
                                                
11 There is more discussion of registration in research on aging and non-neurotypical populations (Ganzetti et 
al. [2018]).  
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the best on the metrics that are most relevant to his project. Which locations he needs to align will 
determine which metrics are important. At least some of the authors working on validation do 
seem to think about their findings in this way. Conroy et al. ([2013]), for example, who propose a 
new registration algorithm and compare it to two alternatives, claim that their method is especially 
good at aligning prefrontal regions (which are particularly difficult to co-register), and should 
therefore be used in studies of social cognition. 
Second, one might worry that the use of different registration methods by different 
researchers presents an obstacle to comparing results across studies. This concern is present in the 
literature. Van Essen and Dierker ([2007]) claim that ‘unintended biases may be introduced when 
comparing datasets registered by different algorithms to different templates’ (p. 1052). They argue 
that, to provide ‘apples-to-apples comparisons’, researchers should use simple linear registration 
methods (Van Essen and Dierker [2007], p.1052). Brett et al. ([2002]) similarly claim that, ‘if we 
have used a different template or a different normalization method, then […] meta-analysis might 
have low spatial resolution and power’ (p. 248). These are reasonable worries, especially 
concerning templates. There is a trade-off between selecting a template that fits the population at 
hand and choosing one that permits easy generalization and cross-study comparison (Evans et al. 
[2012]). However, the problem is less acute in the case of registration. When one conducts a meta-
analysis, the data one is compiling typically concern the same phenomenon. Since the phenomenon 
of interest determines which registration method is appropriate to apply, the data being aggregated 
for meta-analysis usually should not have been registered in wildly different ways.  
Third, one might worry that, given how little we know about the neural basis of many 
cognitive processes, adopting purpose-sensitive registration will introduce bias into research. On 
this line of thinking, making registration decisions based on a partial or incorrect understanding of 
the phenomenon being studied will cause systematic errors of alignment, biasing the results. Using 
a one-size-fits-all registration method also leads to alignment errors, so the objection goes, but at 
least they are theory-free or random. Better to introduce random noise than theory-driven bias. I 
believe this concern, too, is overblown. We are not as ignorant of the brain’s functioning as is 
suggested. To select a purpose-sensitive registration method, we only need some idea of the areas 
that are homologous given the phenomenon under investigation; we do not need to know exactly 
how cognitive capacities are realized in the brain. Moreover, it is not the case that the 
misalignments that occur under a system of purpose-sensitive registration are directional while the 
misalignments resulting from the use of a single, general-purpose method are random. When 
everyone uses the same registration method, researchers make similar alignment errors, leading to 
systematic biases. The status quo of general-purpose registration fares no better than purpose-
sensitive registration from the perspective of bias.12  
                                                
12 An anonymous reviewer raised a related concern: when we apply the cartographic approach in neuroimaging, we 
want to be able to identify activity we were not expecting to find. Purpose-sensitive registration, with its emphasis 
on aligning locations we already know to be involved in the function under study, might make this less likely. This 
is a reasonable concern. However, it is an open empirical question whether the use of a general-purpose registration 
method will make it more likely that unexpected activation will be uncovered than a method known to excel at 
aligning at least some of the implicated areas.  
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Hence, there is reason to think that registration methods should be chosen in a way that is 
sensitive to the phenomenon under investigation, despite legitimate concerns about feasibility, 
comparability, and bias. Entertaining this implication of registration pluralism opens the door to 
several other possible methodological consequences.  
 
7.2 Functional registration 
Functional registration is a type of feature-based registration that uses functional rather than 
structural features to select a mapping between an individual brain image and a template (Sabuncu 
et al. [2010]; Conroy et al. [2013]; Nenning et al. [2017]). Most functional registration methods 
use fMRI data for alignment. In those that rely on task-based fMRI, subjects are presented with a 
specific stimulus or task while functional data are collected. Researchers then find a transformation 
that aligns the functional signals from different subjects. Functional registration is a relatively new 
tool that has generated substantial interest among neuroscientists. Researchers investigating brain 
function no longer need to register brains to a template using structural information and hope that 
structure and function correlate. Instead, functional data can directly drive registration. (Though 
the data driving registration must not be the data to be analysed, on pain of circularity [Sabuncu et 
al. [2010], p. 139]).13  
Registration pluralism warns us to watch out for a potential complication: it may be a 
mistake to think that a single task-based functional registration method can serve all functional 
purposes. I suggested above that there might be different kinds of functional regions that cannot 
be simultaneously aligned. If so, different functional registration methods could be needed in 
different scientific contexts. However, most current methods are intended to be generally 
applicable. In pioneering work on functional registration, researchers asked subjects to watch a 
full-length action movie, Raiders of the Lost Ark, while they collected fMRI data to be used for 
alignment (Sabuncu et al. [2010]; Haxby et al. [2011]; Conroy et al. [2013]). The researchers 
explained that they chose a movie, a ‘complex and dynamic natural stimulus’, because it sampled 
a ‘diverse variety of representational states’ (Haxby et al. [2011], p. 411) and because ‘neural 
activity during a movie viewing is synchronized across subjects in a large percentage of the 
cerebral cortex’ (Sabuncu et al. [2010], p. 131).  
The discussion in Section 6 suggests that trying to find a generic stimulus to be used in a 
universal task-based functional registration method may be misguided. Given the variable and 
dynamic functional organization of the brain, a registration algorithm that aligns brain regions 
involved in passively watching a movie may not align the neural substrates of, say, social 
cognition. If a researcher is ultimately interested in analyzing brain activity during social 
interaction, then, she may be best off not using functional data collected during a movie-watching 
                                                
13 Some functional registration methods begin by aligning images with a simple anatomical registration 
procedure before fine-tuning the alignment with functional information (Sabuncu et al. [2010]; Conroy et al. 
[2013]). Others are explicitly ‘multi-modal’: they use functional and structural information simultaneously 
(Robinson et al. [2014]). It is interesting to note that the registration methods called ‘functional’ typically rely 
on other types of information as well. 
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task as the basis for registration. Instead, registration pluralism seems to suggest that functional 
registration should be purpose-sensitive. Researchers ought to consider aligning brains using fMRI 
data collected while subjects are performing a task that is related to the domain or phenomenon of 
interest. This would generate functional data that could bring the areas that matter into alignment. 
The researcher interested in social cognition, for example, could base her registration method on 
functional data collected while subjects engage in a social task to ensure that areas essential to 
social interaction are aligned.14 There is at least one example in the literature of (something 
resembling15) purpose-sensitive functional registration. Langs et al. ([2010]) aim to identify and 
ultimately align brain regions involved in language-processing across tumor patients. They 
propose a registration method based on fMRI data collected while subjects are engaged in antonym 
generation, a language task. Hence, they ask subjects to perform a task that produces activation in 
the areas they need to align and then use the data collected for registration. It may be fruitful for 
other researchers to follow their example.  
Alternatively, one might argue we should turn away from task-based functional registration 
altogether. Some authors have claimed that task-based methods rely on the implausible assumption 
that different people’s brains are performing the same functions at precisely the same times (Jiang 
et al. [2013]). They argue that we ought instead to use resting-state fMRI to build a functional 
connectivity profile for each subject and then find transformations that bring the individual 
connectivity patterns into alignment (Jiang et al. [2013]; Zhou et al. [2017]; Nenning et al. [2017]; 
Chen et al. [2017]). I am somewhat skeptical of these methods, partly because I share others’ 
doubts about what resting-state fMRI really tells us (Buckner et al. [2013]; McCaffrey and Danks 
[forthcoming]), and partly because functional connectivity-based methods are meant to be general-
purpose. However, such qualitative considerations are far from decisive. A resolution awaits 
systematic quantitative comparison of connectivity-based methods with purpose-sensitive task-
based methods of the kind I have proposed.  
 
7.3 Standardized preprocessing pipelines 
Finally, registration pluralism may undermine projects aimed at standardizing the preprocessing 
of neuroscientific data. There is currently concern among neuroimagers about the lack of 
uniformity in early data processing. They worry that preprocessing is usually ad hoc, making 
neuroimaging less replicable (Esteban et al. [2019]) or generalizable (Gabard-Durnam et al. 
[2018]), and forcing individual labs to ‘repeatedly reinvent the wheel’ (Freeman [2015], p. 156). 
Such concerns have led to efforts to construct standardized preprocessing protocols for different 
                                                
14 Some of the researchers who use a movie stimulus for functional registration recognize that it may not be 
appropriate for all scientific contexts. Sabuncu et al. ([2010]) explain that ‘it is possible that function-based 
normalization based on neural activity evoked by more controlled experiments could be more effective for a 
specific functional region […] The key question is whether a single, optimal warp exists for the cerebral cortex 
or for sectors of the cerebral cortex – or will overlapping topographic maps for different functions be aligned 
optimally by different warps’ (p. 138). They are betting on the former and I am betting on the latter. 
15 The example is, strictly speaking, not an instance of the cartographic approach because Langs et al.’s 
([2010]) technique does not use a standard spatial reference frame.  
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imaging modalities (Bigdely-Shalmo et al. [2015]; Gabard-Durnam et al. [2018]). One example is 
fMRIPrep, a preprocessing workflow recently introduced by Esteban et al. ([2019]) to provide 
‘robust and reproducible preprocessing’ for data from task-based or resting state fMRI (p. 111). 
fMRIPrep involves a spatial normalization step in which individual data are registered to an ICBM 
template using the ANTs registration procedure. Esteban et al. claim that fMRIPrep is ‘analysis-
agnostic’ in the sense that it supports a wide range of analysis and works across many kinds of 
input datasets (Esteban et al. [2019], p. 112). 
 Registration pluralism suggests that any preprocessing pipeline that includes spatial 
registration is not analysis-agnostic. Which registration method is appropriate depends on the 
phenomenon of interest, and hence on the analysis to be performed. Uniformity of preprocessing 
therefore comes at a cost: sometimes different projects really do call for particularized 
preprocessing steps. Some researchers recognize this. Freeman [2015], for instance, stresses the 
importance of balancing ‘standardization and scalability with […] flexibility and interactivity’ (p. 
157). Registration pluralism seems to imply that registration should be highlighted as a locus of 
deliberate choice in standardized workflows. Researchers using tools like fMRIPrep ought to be 
encouraged to think about which registration method suits their purposes best.  
 
8   Registration Pluralism and the Study of the Brain 
The previous section suggested that registration pluralism may have implications for how scientists 
select registration procedures, what tasks are used in functional registration, and which parts of 
preprocessing can be standardized. These issues, I claimed, are deserving of more systematic 
analysis by neuroscientific methodologists. Zooming out from such concrete methodological 
questions, we can also inquire into the broader significance of registration pluralism and the 
empirical evidence of variability on which it is based. What does registration pluralism mean for 
neuroscience in general? 
First, registration pluralism represents an obstacle to the transfer of evidence across 
contexts. Data that have been collected and registered to a template in one way, with one purpose 
in mind, may need to be re-registered in order to apply to a new research question. This is because 
the initial registration may have aligned a different set of features than those requiring alignment 
for the new project. This is resonant with current philosophical work discussing the difficulty of 
sharing scientific data across epistemic contexts (Leonelli [2016]; Boyd [2018]). To use Boyd’s 
([2018]) terminology, empirical results may be maladapted to a scientific theory, meaning that 
they cannot serve as a constraint on that theory because of how data were collected or processed. 
However, sometimes data can be repurposed and become well adapted to theories to which they 
were initially maladapted. According to Boyd, this repurposing is accomplished (in part) using 
‘workflow metadata’, that is, auxiliary information about the data processing that had been 
performed. Information about the registration procedure initially used to aggregate neuroscientific 
data is a kind of workflow metadata that is important to preserve and deploy when we want to 
repurpose neuroscientific results. Just like in the sciences that Leonelli ([2016]) and Boyd ([2018]) 
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discuss, there is danger in transferring neuroscientific data from one context to another without 
taking account of how they were produced. 
 The argument that supports registration pluralism also suggests that there is a type of 
theory-ladenness in data aggregation that is often overlooked by philosophers of science. One 
might have thought that gathering all of one’s data in the same place once it has been collected is 
relatively straightforward. But in neuroscience, this apparently simple task can rely on prior 
information about localization, information that counts as ‘theory’ on a minimal understanding of 
that term. When we deploy the cartographic approach, best practice requires us to know something 
about which locations matter given our explanatory target, or so I have argued. Since our goal is 
accurate alignment, the conditions of success for aggregation depend on the target of investigation. 
Aggregation succeeds when the locations we care about are aligned, but to accomplish this, it is 
helpful to have background neuroscientific theory about which locations those are. As I pointed 
out in Section 7.1, this doesn’t require an extensive understanding of the brain’s workings, but it 
does make data aggregation using the cartographic approach somewhat theory-laden.  
 The theory-ladenness of the cartographic approach strengthens an existing philosophical 
argument about the epistemic status of neuroimages. Pushing back against the hype surrounding 
neuroimaging, several authors have claimed that neuroimages are quite unlike standard 
photographs. Klein ([2010]) highlights two primary dissimilarities: unlike ordinary pictures, 
neuroimages are laden with theoretical assumptions and present the results of statistical tests rather 
than raw data. Klein explains that neuroimages cannot be interpreted without understanding the 
experimental design that produced the data and the specific tasks that the subjects performed. 
Roskies ([2007]) calls this property ‘belief-opaqueness’: neuroimages are belief-opaque because 
‘the information needed for the[ir] interpretation is not present in the resultant image’ (p. 868). 
Registration pluralism reinforces these claims. Neuroimages depicting aggregate results are 
theory-laden in an additional way not discussed by Klein ([2010]) or Roskies ([2007]), since 
aggregation itself is another substantive and theory-laden data processing step involved in 
visualizing neuroscientific data. Moreover, one cannot tell from looking at an aggregate 
neuroimage how the data have been registered to the template. This is yet another way in which 
neuroimages are belief-opaque.  
An interesting philosophical question is whether similar conclusions hold in other domains. 
Aggregation of data would seem to require additional input whenever it isn’t obvious which data 
points count as ‘the same’. One (but by no means the only) source of such ambiguity, as I have 
shown, is individual differences. Variation complicates the task of figuring out which observations 
or measurements are directly comparable across subjects. Data aggregation may therefore be 
purpose-driven and theory-laden in interesting ways throughout the psychological and social 
sciences.  
 
9   Conclusion 
This paper has aimed to characterize, defend, and explore the implications of a pluralist view about 
the cartographic approach to aggregation across brains. Because registration aims to align 
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homologous regions, but not all homologous regions can be simultaneously aligned, there can be 
no single spatial registration method that suffices for all neuroscientific purposes. A few 
neuroscientists endorse the thesis of registration pluralism outright (Hellier et al. [2003]), some 
acknowledge it implicitly (Dubois and Adolphs [2016]), but at least a few seem to reject it 
(Robinson et al. [2014]). Even those who recognize the truth of registration pluralism may not 
have fully grappled with its methodological and philosophical implications, which I have begun 
to explore.  
Neuroscience has undoubtedly benefited from its increasing reliance on multi-subject 
studies in addition to single, pathological cases: it has been able to study normal functioning in 
non-clinical populations, enjoyed an increase in statistical power, and produced findings that are 
more generalizable. But the field is still wrestling with the additional challenges posed by the 
aggregation of data across brains. As I hope to have shown here, reflection on the strategies used 
for aggregation is needed to appropriately deploy neuroscientific tools in multi-subject research 
and fully understand the results they produce. 
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Figure 1. Schematic representation of the cartographic approach. 
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